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Exclusive Territorial Rights in Patent Licenses 
and Article 85 of the EEC Treaty: An 
Evaluation of Recent Developments in the Law 
by Brian Cheffins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the European Economic Community (EEC, Common Market),1 during 
recent years, the law relating to territorial restrictions in patent licenses has 
developed significantly. In 1982 the European Court of Justice (European 
Court),2 in Maize Seeds,3 made some important pronouncements regarding ter-
ritorial restrictions in intellectual property licensing agreements. Territorial 
restriction also played an important part in the Block Exemption for Patent 
Licenses (Block Exemption).4 This Regulation was issued by the European 
Commission (Commission)5 in 1984. Overall, the EEC may have wholly worked 
• Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This article is based on a thesis 
submitted in partial satisfaction of the LL.M. degree at Cambridge. My thanks to Elizabeth Freeman, 
Clare College, Cambridge, for her help in supervising my LL.M. thesis. 
I The European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] was created by a treaty signed on March 
25, 1957 and came into force on January I, 1958. With the addition of Spain and Portugal to the 
EEC on January I, 1986, it now consists of twelve Member States. The six original Member States 
were Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. On January I, 1973, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmarkjoined the EEC. Greece, which signed a Treaty of Accession 
in 1979, joined the EEC on January I, 1981. 
The EEC, in principle, is general in scope and covers all sectors of the economy not specifically 
covered by the other Communities. T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 3 
(1981). Consequently, the EEC can be distinguished from the European Coal and Steel Community 
[hereinafter ECSC] and the European Atomic Energy Community [hereinafter Euratom], which, as 
their names indicate, are limited to particular sectors of the economy. 
2 The Court of Justice of the European Communities [hereinafter European Court] acts as a referee 
between the Member States and the three Communities, and among Community institutions. The 
European Court also acts to protect the rights guaranteed to individuals under the Treaties. 
'Nungesser and Eisele v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2015, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. 278 
(1983). 
4 Regulation 2349/84, 27 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984), [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH). 10,610 (1984). 
5 The European Commission, which is the most supra-national of the EEC institutions, formulates 
proposals for new Community policies and administers existing policies. Though Commissioners are 
appointed by the governments of the Member States, they are required to be above national loyalties 
and in no sense represent their countries. T. HARTi.EY, supra note I, at 9. 
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out the relevant principles in this area.6 This is significant, as the topic of 
territorial restrictions in patent licenses has been controversial for more than 
twenty years.7 Given this, it is not surprising that the impact of Maize Seeds and 
the Block Exemption on EEC law has been examined extensively.8 
Despite such an extensive examination, a further analysis of how Maize Seeds 
and the Block Exemption deal with territorial restrictions can still provide 
insights into other areas of EEC law. These include the economic costs and 
benefits of territorial restrictions in patent licenses, the relationship between 
market integration and competition law in the EEC, and the difficulties involved 
in administering and enforcing the EEC's competition law. This Article will 
examine these areas in the context of Maize Seeds and the Block Exemption. At 
the same time Maize Seeds and the Block Exemption will be critically evaluated. 
It will be argued that even though complicated issues are undoubtedly involved, 
the European Commission's and the European Court's approaches to territorial 
restrictions have flaws. Primarily, the Commission and the Court have not dealt 
satisfactorily with some of the economic and market integration concerns in-
volved with territorial restrictions. It will be seen that in the case of the Com-
mission, this has occurred in part because of lobbying and administrative pres-
sures. 
The Article is divided into three parts. In the first, the nature of territorial 
restriction in patent licenses will be described. Next, the current law relating to 
this area will be summarized. Finally, the law will be evaluated, with primary 
focus on Maize Seeds and the Block Exemption. 
II. THE NATURE OF TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS IN PATENT LICENSES 
When a patentee grants a license to manufacture and sell a patented product 
or to utilize a patented process in manufacturing and selling a product, the 
licensee, when he markets the product in his country, can face competition from 
a number of sources.9 These include the patentee, other licensees, whether 
based in the licensee's territory or outside it, and resellers supplied by the 
patentee or other licensees. A patentee, like a licensee, also faces potential 
6 R. MERKIN & K. WILLIAMS, COMPETITION LAW: ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
THE E.E.C. 294 (1984). 
7 For a useful summary of the history involved, see Stone, The E.E.G. Block Exemption for Patent 
Licences-Part 1,7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 173 (1985); D. GUY & G. LEIGH, THE EEC AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 163-69, 174-81. 
8 On Maize Seeds, see Hoffmann & O'Farrell, The Open Exclusive Licence--Scope and Consequences, 6 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 104 (1984) and sources cited therein at note 2. On the Block Exemption, see 
Stone, supra note 7; Hearn, More on Patent Licensing in the E.E.C.-I, 1985 SOL. J. 325; Lewin & Martin, 
Patent Licensing in the E.E.C., 6 COMPANY LAW. 62 (1985); V. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING AND E.E.C. 
COMPETITION RULES REGULATION 2349/84 (1985). 
9 Van der Esch,lndustrial Property Rights Under E.E.C. Law, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM 
CORPORATE LAw INSTITUTE-ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE E.E.C., 539, 541 (B. Hawk ed. 
1983). 
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competition from several sources. These sources of competition include all of 
his licensees and resellers supplied by the licensees. 
A patent license can include terms meant to give a degree of protection from 
competition. 1O As a start, a patentee can promise not to grant any other licenses 
in a licensee's territory. The licensee will then have what is referred to as a sole 
license to manufacture and sell the patent-based product in his territory. Fur-
ther, the patentee can promise not to manufacture and sell in the licensee's 
territory. The licensee will then have an exclusive license in such territory. The 
patentee can give himself the same degree of territorial protection by refraining 
from granting licenses in his own territory. 
The patentee can give a licensee further protection by providing for an export 
ban on sales into the licensee's territory. The patentee can achieve this by 
promising not to sell the patent-based product in the licensee's territory and by 
promising to oblige other licensees to refrain from doing the same. A patentee 
can help to secure similar protection for himself and other licensees by getting 
the licensee to agree to an export ban. The licensee will thus agree not to export 
the patent-based product to the patentee's territory or any territory where the 
patentee has granted a license. 
There is one other way in which patent licenses can protect patentees and 
licensees from competition. This is by imposing export bans on resales. To 
achieve this, the licensee will agree to sell only to customers who agree not to 
resell in the patentee's territory or any territory where the patentee has granted 
a license. Further, the patentee will agree to only sell to customers who agree 
not to sell in the licensee's territory. Finally, the patentee will get his other 
licensees to make the same promise as the first licensee regarding resales. 
When placed together in patent licenses, the provisions discussed above give 
a patentee and his licensees extensive territorial protection. The patentee and 
the licensee not only have the exclusive right to manufacture and sell in their 
respective territories, they also are protected from competition with each other. 
In addition, all parties are protected from competition with their respective 
customers. 
III. CURRENT LAW 
In the EEC Treatyll the articles which are most relevant to territorial protec-
tion in patent licenses are 85 and 30 thru 36. 12 The majority of this Article will 
10 The following is based on B. CAWTHRA, PATENT LICENSING IN EUROPE 46 (1978); B. FOWLSTON, 
UNDERSTANDING COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LICENSING 4 (1984); R. MERKIN & K. WILLIAMS, supra 
note 6, at 32; R. WHISH, COMPETITION LAw 352 (1985). 
11 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S.3. 
12 Article 85 provides that: 
I. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted prac-
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focus upon the law ansmg from Article 85. Articles 30 thru 36 will also be 
discussed with respect to the extent to which provisions have to be placed in 
patent licenses in order to secure territorial protection for a patentee and his 
licensees. 
Prior to the passage of the EEC Treaty, if parties to a patent license wanted 
to ensure that the patent-based product did not pass between their territories, 
it was not as necessary to include an export ban between themselves and to 
place restrictions on their customers. This was because national patent laws 
could be relied on to restrict sales between countries.13 To illustrate, assume 
that a patentee held parallel patents in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom. Assume further he granted exclusive manufacturing and 
sales licenses in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, and retained the U.K. 
market for himself. The patentee and licensees would have been able to prevent 
tices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in 
particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no con-
nection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
Article 30 provides that U[ q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effe£t shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States." 
Article 36 states that: 
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States. 
13 See Casati, The U Exhaustion" of Industrial Property Rights in the EEC: Exclusive Manufacturing and Sales 
Provisions in Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements, 17 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 325 (1978); 
Turner, Competition and the Common Market After Maize Seed, 8 EUR. L. REv. 103, 108 (1983); P. DEMARET, 
PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS, AND EEC LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 59-62 (1978). 
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the importation of the patent-based product into each other's territories by 
bringing infringement actions. Thus, if the French licensee sold the patent-
based product to a customer who tried to resell in the United Kingdom, or the 
French licensee himself tried to sell the product in the United Kingdom, the 
patentee could prevent the sale of the product in the United Kingdom. Specif-
ically, the patentee could claim that his patent rights were being infringed. 
National systems of patent law continue to exist in the EEC. Articles 30 to 
36, which seek to establish the free movement of goods in the EEC, however, 
have distinctly reduced the extent to which national patent laws can be used to 
restrict the movement of patent-based products within the EEC. For example, 
it is clear that an infringement action cannot be used to prevent the customer 
of a licensee or a patentee from importing patented goods into a Member State 
where the good in question has patent protection. 14 This is because the Euro-
pean Court has held that once a patentee has obtained a monetary reward from 
selling, or consenting to the sale of, a patent-based product in the EEC, his 
patent rights cannot be relied on to prevent the importation of the patent-based 
product into any Member State. ls This principle is clearly applicable to custom-
ers of patentees. Further, because by granting a license the patentee will have 
consented to the sale of the patent-based product in the EEC and will have 
received his reward in the form of a license fee or royalty, this principle also 
applies to customers of licensees. 
It is not clear whether a patentee, or a licensee relying on patent rights, can 
prevent imports by a licensee from another Member State. 16 The European 
Court has clearly stated that patent rights cannot be used to prevent imports as 
soon as the patent-based product has been placed on the market in the country 
from which the product was being imported. This, however, does not apply to 
a situation where the licensee does the importing himself. 17 
The indications, however, are that the European Court would not allow patent 
rights to stop such importing. In recent cases the Court has been paying greater 
attention to the idea that a patent is a reward for inventive effort. IS This reward 
is the exclusive right of being the first to market the patent-based product. 
Given this, it can be argued that when a patentee grants a license he receives 
his reward in the form of license fees and/or royalty fees. According to such 
14 Casati, supra note 13, at 326. 
15 Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 480 
(1974); P. OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE E.E.C. 156-61 (1982). 
16 Lang, Patent Rights and Licensing in E.E.C. Law, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY COMPETITION 
LAW 59, 65 (G. Sundstrom ed. 1978). 
17 Casati, supra note 13, at 326. 
18 Pharmon B.V. v. Hoechst Alb, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 755, 791 (1985); Merck v. Stephar, 1981 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063, 2081, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) If 8707 
(1981). 
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reasoning, his patent rights should not be able to be relied on to retard the 
movement of the patent-based product between Member States, including 
movement arising from direct sales by licensees. 19 Thus, so long as the Court 
continues to focus its inquiry on the reward to the patentee, it is likely that the 
Court will hold that direct sales by licensees from one Member State into another 
are not prohibited under national patent laws. 
The foregoing indicates that if a patentee and his licensees want to establish 
territorial protection within the EEC, they will not be able to rely effectively on 
the patent laws of the Member States. Instead, territorial protection and exclu-
sive territorial rights will have to be established through the use of the terms of 
the patent licenses at issue. This may, however, cause the licenses to run afoul 
of Article 85. It is well established that patent licenses which grant exclusive 
rights and/or contain territorial restrictions can fall within Article 85(1). Article 
85(1) prohibits agreements between persons, companies, and other undertak-
ings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within 
the EEC. Under Article 85(3), however, a patent license falling within Article 
85(1) can be exempted from prohibition and invalidation in certain instances. 
A patent license is exempt if, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, it contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or it promotes technical or economic progress. 
During the 1970s the European Commission took the view that if an agree-
ment was not too minor,20 a patent license containing territorial protection 
would automatically fall within Article 85(1). Consequently, the patent license 
would have to be exempted by the Commission under Article 85(3) in order to 
remain valid.21 In the early 1980s the European Court, in two cases dealing 
with other types of intellectual property, overturned the Commission's view. In 
Maize Seeds,22 which involved plant breeders rights, and Coditel v. Cine Vog Films 
(No. 2),23 a copyright case, the Court held that territorial restrictions did not 
necessarily bring the agreements in question within Article 85(1). Rather, other 
19 Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 108; Casati, supra note 13, at 328-29. In Pharmon v. 
Hoechst, supra note 18, the Court held that a patentee could rely on patent law to restrict direct sales 
by a licensee from another country. The basis of the Court's reasoning was that the patentee had not 
received his full reward because the license had been compulsorily granted. If the license had been 
granted voluntarily, the Court likely would have held that he had received his full reward and thus 
could not rely on patent law to prevent imports by a licensee. 
20 As was the case In Re Burroughs/Delplanque, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 67 (1972). 
21 R. MERKIN & K. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 333; Hawk, Patents Under EEC Competition Law, 53 
ANTITRUST L.J. 737, 750-51 (1984). 
22 See supra note 3. 
23 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3381, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. 49 (1983). The case is discussed in 
O'Farrell, Recent Developments in Copyright in the E.E.C., 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 102, 105 (1985). 
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circumstances had to be considered in order to determine the applicability of 
Article 85(1). 
The European Court's holding in Maize Seeds is of particular interest because 
the Court discussed the types of territorial protection which do not bring an 
agreement within the ambit of Article 85(1). Though the case did not involve 
patent rights, the Court's reasoning is probably applicable to patent licenses.24 
Maize Seeds suggests that a patent license containing territorial restrictions will 
not fall into Article 85(1) in certain circumstances. 25 First, the patent must 
involve a new technology. Second, the risk and development costs involved must 
have had to have deterred the licensee from taking the license if there had been 
no territorial protection. Finally, the license must have been an open rather 
than a closed exclusive license.26 A license is considered open if it gives the 
licensee exclusive rights in his territory and prevents the patentee from making 
direct sales into the licensee's territory,27 A license is considered closed if it 
obliges the patentee to get other licensees and third parties to promise not to 
sell a product in the licensee's territory. The distinction between these two 
situations is that open exclusivity relates only to the contractual relationship 
between the patentee and the licensee.28 It is unclear if a license becomes closed 
when a licensee agrees not to export into the patentee's territory.29 
As discussed previously, the European Commission, prior to Maize Seeds, 
considered patent licenses containing territorial restrictions to automatically fall 
within Article 85(1). Since the validity of such patent licenses turned on whether 
they were exempted, the Commission encountered the administrative difficulty 
of processing a large number of exemption applications. 3D Due to this difficulty, 
the Commission, in the mid-1970s, proposed a Regulation which granted au-
tomatic exemptions. 31 Under the proposed regulation a patent license would 
automatically be exempted if it did not contain certain prohibited terms. Fur-
thermore, under the Regulation, certain terms were to be expressly permitted. 
Initially, the European Commission, in its proposals, was hostile towards 
territorial restrictions. This was manifested in a Commission draft, which be-
2. Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 104. 
25 Stone, supra note 7, at 174; Hawk, supra note 21, at 751, 755. 
26 Commentators' views on this point vary somewhat. See Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 
104-06; Van der Esch, supra note 9, at 546-47; Turner, supra note 13, at 106-07, 113; O'Farrell, 
supra note 23, at 105; Hawk, supra note 21, at 752-54. V. KORAH, supra note 8, at 5, says that a product 
need not involve a new technology but should extend to where there is a new product for which there 
is no substitute. 
27 Hawk, supra note 21, at 752; Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 107. 
2. Hawk, supra note 21, at 751-52; Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 107. 
29 Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 107-08. 
30 R. WHISH, supra note 10, at 364; Lewin & Martin, supra note 8, at 63. 
31 Brunsvold, EE.C. Commission Hearings on Draft Patent Licence Regulations, in 1981 LICENSING LAW 
HANDBOOK 291, 292 (B. Brunsvold ed. 1981). 
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came public in 1977, which enumerated narrow grounds for exemption. The 
narrow allowance of territorial restrictions was extensively criticized.32 As a 
result, each successive Commission draft became increasingly permissive.33 
Finally, almost ten years after the Regulation was first proposed, Regulation 
2349/8434 was issued by the European Commission. This Regulation is com-
monly referred to as the Block Exemption for Patent Licenses. The Block 
Exemption is more permissive towards territorial restrictions than any of the 
draft regulations were. 
Under the Block Exemption, sole and exclusive licenses are exempted as long 
as one of the patents covered by the license remains in force.35 Further, an 
export ban between a patentee and a licensee is permitted. A patentee's promise 
not to sell in the licensee's territory is exempted as long as one of the licensed 
patents remains in force. Further, a licensee's promise not to sell in territories 
reserved for the patentee is exempted so long as the patent-based product is 
protected in those territories by parallel patents.36 
The exemption for territorial protection between licensees is not as extensive 
as that between patentees and licensees. A complete export ban between licen-
sees will only be exempted if it lasts no longer than five years after the patented 
product is put on the market in the EEC.37 If passive sales into other licensees' 
territories are banned for longer than five years then the automatic exemption 
is not allowed. 38 A promise by a licensee not to pursue an active sales policy in 
another licensees' territories, however, is exempted for as long as the licensed 
product is protected in those territories by a parallel patent.39 Though the exact 
scope of an active sales policy is unclear, it does encompass advertizing specifi-
cally aimed at another licensee's territory and the opening of a branch or any 
disposition depot in such a territory.4o 
Another type of territorial protection which will cause a patent license to lose 
an exemption is a promise to impose an export ban on resellers.41 The Block 
Exemption stipulates that a promise by a patentee or licensee to refuse to supply 
32 B. CAWTHRA, supra note 10, at 60-62; Handler & Blechman, An American View of the Common 
Market's Proposed Group Exemption for Patent Licences, 14 INT'L LAW. 403 (1980); Holley & Siragusa, The 
Status of the Commission's Proposed Patent Licensing Regulation, 1 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 350, 351 (1979). 
33 The development of these provisions is well-summarized in Stone, supra note 7, at 176-78 and V. 
KORAH, supra note 8, at 32, 40. 
34 See supra note 4. 
35 See supra note 4, at art. 1(1)(1) and (2). For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase "in so far 
as and as long as one of the licensed patents remain in force," see V. KORAH, supra note 8, at 34. 
36 See supra note 4, at art. 1(1)-(4). 
37Id. at art. 1(1)(6). 
3. Id. at art. 3(10). 
39Id. at art. 1(1)(5). 
40Id. 
41Id. at art. 3(11). 
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a customer who would market the product in other territories will cause the 
exemption to be lost unless there is an objectively justified reason for the 
provision. 
The Block Exemption does not apply to all patent licenses. Instead, it only 
applies to agreements involving two parties.42 With respect to export bans 
between licensees, however, the Block Exemption clearly applies to agreements 
forming a network of licenses if each agreement has the patentee and one 
licensee as its only parties.43 In addition, the Block Exemption evidently does 
not apply to licensing agreements concerning sales alone. 44 The licensee must 
manufacture the patent-based product, as well as sell it. Licensing agreements 
involving sales alone can be exempted under Regulation 1983/83 on Exclusive 
Distribution Agreements. 45 An exemption of a patent license containing terri-
torial provisions can be obtained in certain circumstances where it would not 
be exempted under the Block Exemption. Such an exemption can be obtained 
by applying to the European Commission. The Commission will grant an in-
dividual exemption if the agreement falls within Article 85(3). An individual 
exemption will have to be applied for if the agreement involves more than two 
parties or if the agreement contains a term which falls within the Block Ex-
emption blacklist. An agreement loses its exemption under Regulation 2349/84 
if it contains any of the terms in the blacklist. 46 The provisions discussed above 
relating to bans on passive sales between licensees' territories and to restrictions 
on customers are two examples of terms included in the blacklist. 47 The re-
maining terms included in the blacklist do not deal with territorial protection.48 
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LAW 
In evaluating the recent development of the law relating to territorial restric-
tions in patent licenses, it is useful to examine the law from three perspectives. 
First, the economic theories underlying the recent developments in the law will 
be considered. Second, the market integration aspects of territorial restrictions 
will be discussed. Third, the administration and enforcement issues relating to 
the recent developments in the law will be analyzed. 
" /d. at art. 1 (I). 
43 Stone, supm note 7, at 175. 
"See supm note 4, at Preamble, para. 7 and art. 1(2). See v. KORAH, supra note 8, at 14-16. Stone 
holds the view that patent licenses dealing only with sales may be exempted under the Block Exemption. 
See Stone, supra note 7, at 178. 
45 Reg. 1983/83, 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983). 
46 See supra note 4, at art. 3 for the Block Exemption blacklist. 
·17 /d. 
48 Examples of such terms include imposing pr;ce controls, preventing the challenging of the licensed 
patent and requiring the licensee to assign improvements on the patent to the licensor. See supra note 
4, at art. 3(11). 
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A. Economic Issues 
1. General Considerations 
The EEC's approach to territorial protection in patent licenses has become 
less strict in recent years. The European Court's decision in Maize Seeds, that 
intellectual property licenses granting territorial protection do not automatically 
fall within Article 85(1), is more permissive than the European Commission's 
view that all such licenses fell within Article 85(1). Likewise, the scope of the 
exemptions allowed in the Block Exemption is significantly wider than the scope 
of the exemption allowed by the Commission in granting individual exemptions. 
Prior to the Block Exemption, patent licenses incorporating export bans involv-
ing patentees and licensees were only granted exemptions in limited circum-
stances.49 Even licenses incorporating only exclusive rights were not granted 
automatic exemptions. 50 
The concerns which have contributed to the relaxation of the law relating to 
territorial restrictions have primarily been economic in origin.51 The European 
Court and European Commission's more liberal views toward territorial restric-
tions have arisen from a changed perception of the economic impact of such 
restrictions. Such restrictions are not perceived by the Court and the Commis-
sion as being as anticompetitive as was previously the case.52 Further, the Court 
and the Commission are more receptive to the idea that such restrictions help 
to promote innovation and the diffusion of technology in the EEC.53 
The European Court and the European Commission's consideration of eco-
nomic factors is understandable in this context. Both patent and antitrust law 
are distinctly economic in content. 54 As one commentator has said, a coherent 
analysis of territorial restrictions in patent licenses in the EEC cannot be done 
without delving into economic theory. 55 Due to the importance of economic 
theory, it is necessary to discern whether the economic reasoning underlying 
the Court's decisions and the Block Exemption is sound. 
It has been recognized for many years that the manner in which patent rights 
are utilized can conflict with competition law. 56 There have been many attempts 
49 Stone, supra note 7, at 177. 
50 Id.; See also Gyselen, Vertical Restraints in the Distribution Process: Strength and Weakness of the Free 
Rider Rationale Under EEC Competition Law, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647, 660 (1984). 
51 Baillie, Licensing Under the EEC Treaty: Practical Problems and Solutions, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 689, 695 
(1985); Commission of the EEC, 14TH REpORT ON COMPETITION 13-14 (1984) [hereinafter Commission 
14TH REpORT]; R. WHISH, supra note 10, at 363. 
52Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1886-89 (1984). 
55 P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at I. 
56 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 505 (1977); Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1815-
16, 1845-55; Austern, Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1015 (1965). 
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to analyze and resolve this conflict.57 Despite this history of analysis, recent 
articles in which economic analysis has been utilized are the most instructive. It 
has been emphasized that economic costs and benefits should be considered in 
resolving patent/competition law problems." For example, relaxing restrictions 
on the exercise of patent rights may, in addition to having the beneficial effect 
of increasing incentives for innovation, give rise to economic costs arising from 
increased restraints on competition. 
The most helpful, but at the same time most intricate, of the recent comments 
is by Louis Kaplow.59 Even Kaplow acknowledges that his formula for resolving 
patent/competition law conflicts is too complex to be utilized by today's policy-
makers.60 Nevertheless, his basic analysis provides helpful insights into the 
decisions which policymakers face in this area. 
As applied to territorial restrictions in patent licenses, Kaplow's analysis would 
operate as follows. A policy should be adopted when the result of doing so will 
be that the total benefits of territorial restrictions, these being incentives to 
potential innovators, exceed by the greatest possible amount the total costs, 
these being the detriment to the economy arising from the anticompetitive 
effects of the territorial restrictions. 61 To find the point where the net benefits 
of territorial restrictions are greatest, it is necessary to examine whether the 
ratio of benefits to costs arising from allowing a type of territorial restriction is 
greater than one. If it is, the restriction should be allowed. If not, it should not 
be allowed. 
To understand this analysis, consider a situation where no territorial restric-
tions are allowed. At this point, the benefits and costs arising from territorial 
restrictions would be zero. The next step would then be to examine progressively 
stricter territorial restrictions. The restriction would be permitted so long as the 
ratio of benefits to costs for each restriction continued to be greater than one. 
This is because as each restriction is allowed, the difference between total 
benefits and costs increases. The restrictions would no longer be allowed when 
the ratio for the last restriction was less than one. If this restriction was allowed 
total benefits would exceed total costs by less than if the restriction was not 
allowed. It would be at the point before the last restriction was added that the 
total net benefits would be greatest.62 
57 Kaplow provides a useful survey of them. See Kaplow. supra note 54. at 1845-55. 
58 Kaplow, supra note 54. and Ordover. Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial 
and Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503 (1984) contain the most detailed economic analysis. See 
also Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse Constraintl on the Exploitation of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 489-95 (1984); Payne & Bagarazzi, Effect of'the EEC Rules of 
Competition on Industrial Property Rights and Technology Transfer, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LICENSING 
245 (1981). 
59 Kaplow, supra note 54. 
6U Id. at 1833, 1841-45. 
6IId. at 1827. 
62 The foregoing is based on Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1829-34. 
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As mentioned, such an analysis cannot be used to form a policy towards 
territorial restrictions with any precision. This is because the problems of mea-
surement are too great.53 The analysis does, however, provide insights into how 
policies towards territorial restrictions have been formed. For example, in the 
United States there was a great deal of concern, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
about the anticompetitive effects arising from the exploitation of patent rights 
and little concern about the effect that restricting such exploitation would have 
on inventive activity.54 According to Kaplow'S analysis, the ratio of benefits to 
costs arising from allowing the exploitation of patent rights was thought to be 
low. Thus, it was perceived that the point at which the net benefits arising from 
the exploitation of patent rights was greatest when comparatively few methods 
of patent exploitation were allowed. Consequently, the antitrust restrictions on 
such exploitation were quite stringent.65 
Presently in the United States there is a greater concern about the importance 
of providing incentives for innovation and less concern about the anticompeti-
tive effects of patent exploitation. As a result, the ratio of benefits to costs 
arising from patent exploitation is perceived to be higher than it was during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, the point at which the net benefits from patent 
exploitation are perceived to be greatest is when comparatively more methods 
of patent exploitation are allowed. The antitrust restrictions on patent exploi-
tation in the United States are consequently more relaxed than they were.66 
A similar process has been occurring in the EEC regarding territorial restric-
tions in patent licenses. As mentioned, the EEC's more relaxed posture towards 
territorial restrictions has arisen, in part, because the European Court and the 
European Commission have been focusing more on the innovation that can be 
created by allowing territorial restrictions and less on the potential anticompet-
itive effects of territorial restrictions. In Kaplow's terms, the EEC's policy has 
changed because of a different perception of the ratio of economic benefits to 
costs arising from territorial restrictions. In light of the Kaplow analysis, this 
Article will proceed to examine the views of the Court and the Commission 
with respect to the economic benefit and costs of territorial restrictions in patent 
53 Id. at 1842-45; Ordover, supra note 58. at 513. 
fi4 A. CROTTI, TRADING UNDER EEC AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 259-61 (1977); Gibbons, Domestic 
Territorial Restrictions in Patent Transactions and the Antitrust Laws, 34 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 903-04, 
925 (1966); Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450,459-60 (1969); 
Austern, supra note 56. 
65 See supra note 64 and especially Austern. 
fi6 On the background to the charges in the United States, see Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty 
Terml in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1198,1198-1201,1225 (1983) [hereinafter Royalty Terms]; 
Andewelt, Technology Licensing and the Antitrust Laws-the View from the Department of Justice, in THE LAW 
AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING: LICENSING IN THE 19805, 2B-319 (R. Goldscheider & T. Arnold eds. 
1983); Hudspeth, Recent Developments in the Potent/Antitrust Interface-Response to a New Reality, 3 J. L. 
& COM. 35 (1983). 
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licenses. Next, it will be explained how these changed perceptions have altered 
EEC law. 
2. Benefits 
The European Commission's most recent Reports on Competition Law and the 
preamble to the Block Exemption indicate that the Commission maintains that 
allowing exclusive rights and territorial restrictions will promote innovation and 
the diffusion of technology, thus benefitting the EEC.67 This contrasts with the 
Commission's suggestion in 1979 that the promotion of innovation by territorial 
protection in patent licenses was only relevant to smaller companies.68 The 
language used in Maize Seeds indicates that the European Court supports the 
idea that allowing territorial restrictions promotes new technology.69 The Court's 
favorable attitude towards the relationship between patents and innovation is 
also manifested in the Court's increased emphasis on the idea that the primary 
purpose of patents is to reward innovation.70 
In order for the European Commission and the European Court to be correct 
about the benefits of territorial restrictions, three conditions have to exist. First, 
allowing exclusive rights and territorial restrictions in patent licenses must in-
crease the reward to potential innovators. Second, increased rewards to paten-
tees have to stimulate innovative activity. Finally, increased innovation has to 
increase social welfare. 71 An examination of the latter two conditions is beyond 
the scope of this Article, as they relate to the utility of the patent system in 
general. 72 Therefore, since an examination of territorial restriction in patent 
licenses presupposes the existence of patents, it will be assumed that giving an 
increased reward to innovators stimulates innovation and that innovation in-
creases social welfare. 73 
In examining the first condition it is necessary to determine to what extent 
allowing territorial restrictions in patent licenses increases the reward to paten-
tees. To answer this question it is important to consider two broad situations 
where allowing territorial protection will increase the reward to patentees. First, 
67 See Commission of the EEC, 13TH REPORT ON COMPETITION 46 (1983); 14TH REPORT, supra note 
51, at 14,40; see supra note 4, at Recital 12. 
68 Burnside, Licences, Export Bans in the E.E.C., in THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING: LiCENSING 
IN THE 1980s 2B-57, 2B-70 (R. Goldscheider & T. Arnold eds. 1983). 
69 See Nungesser, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, at para. 57. 
70 See supra notes 18, and 19. 
71 Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1824; Turner, supra note 64, at 451-53. 
72 On these assumptions see Turner, supra note 64, at 453-55; P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 8-10; 
BOWMAN, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST 3, 8-9, 15-38 (1973); Levin, Patents in Perspective, 53 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 519 (1984). 
73 These assumptions are presently widely accepted. See Royalty Terms, supra note 66, at 1198-1200; 
Hudspeth, supra note 66, at 35-39, 48. 
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assuming a patentee is going to market the patent-based product in his territory, 
he will increase his revenue from sales if he does not face competition in his 
territory from his licensees or others. In this situation he may well be able to 
charge higher prices in his territory, regardless of how the product is marketed 
outside his territory. Second, assuming that the patentee will be utilizing licen-
sees to market his product outside his territory, granting territorial protection 
to the licensees may result in the patent-based product being marketed more 
profitably by himself and his licensees. 
There is a distinction between these two situations. While in both the profit 
from sales of the patent-based product will be higher, the proportion of the 
increase going to the patentee differs. 74 In the first situation all the increase 
goes to the patentee, while in the second a portion goes to the licensees. This 
is significant because it is the reward to the patentee which is crucial for pro-
moting innovation.75 Consequently, this distinction acts as a partial economic 
justification for the Block Exemption giving patentees more protection from 
competition from their licensees than licensees have from other licensees. As 
mentioned, the Block Exemption allows a complete export ban between paten-
tees and licensees, but does not allow a ban on passive sales by licensees into 
other licensees' territories to last more than five years. 
This reasoning, however, is not entirely sound. 76 This, in part, is because a 
patentee will often have a better understanding of how to utilize and market 
the patented process. As a result, he will have a competitive advantage and will 
not need to be insulated from competition.77 Further, even if the patentee does 
not have a competitive advantage, the patentee can set the licensees' royalties 
payments high enough to give himself such an advantage or to compensate for 
his loss of sales.78 Beyond this, even if the territorial protection in the Block 
Exemption is sufficient to protect a patentee from competition with his licensees, 
this will do little to ;ncrease the patentee's reward if there are close substitutes 
for the patent-based product. This is because customers will buy a lower priced 
close substitute if the patentee tries to raise the price of the patent-based product 
too much. Thus, the greater protection from competition which the Block 
Exemption allows for patentees will not always increase the reward to the 
patentees. 
As has been discussed, the second broad situation where a patentee's reward 
will be increased is where the patentee grants territorial protection to licensees 
74 Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1835-37, 1860, 1879, recognizes that the portion of the reward going 
to the patentee has to be kept in mind. 
75 This is because potential patentees will only be induced to invent by the reward they receive and 
not by the reward their licensees receive. See P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 73. 
76 Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 108-09, see little justification for the distinction. 
77 Id. See also Casati, supra note 13, at 347. 
78 See Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1855-1857; P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 57. 
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used to market his product outside his territory. There are two general circum-
stances where such territorial restrictions will result in a patent-based product 
being sold more profitably by a patentee and his licensees. One is when the 
territorial protection is being used as part of a collusive attempt to establish 
market division and control. 79 In this circumstance the patentee's reward will 
increase not only because the patentee will be protected from competition in 
his territory, but also because his licensees will pay higher license fees and 
royalties than they would otherwise. This is because the licensees will be able to 
make monopolistic profits in their territory which they could not if faced with 
competition. 
The second circumstance where territorial restrictions will result in a patent-
based product being sold more profitably is where the restrictions facilitate the 
efficient distribution of the patent-based product. Again, if the patent-based 
product is distributed more efficiently and profitably, the patentee's reward will 
increase not only because his sales revenue might increase, but also because his 
licensees will pay higher royalties as a result of their higher profits. sO There are 
a number of reasons why using patent licenses incorporating exclusive rights 
and territorial protections might facilitate the distribution of a patent-based 
product. Relying on licensees might reduce the risk faced by a patentee.Bl 
Administrative costs may be lower when there is one rather than several licensees 
in each territory.82 The structure of the market in a particular territory may be 
such that it can only profitably support a single firm.83 Territorial protection 
may facilitate territorial price discrimination.B4 Finally, territorial protection 
might be necessary to induce someone to take a license in a particular territory 
which the patentee would not otherwise be able to exploit.as 
Justification of the EEC's expansive approach towards territorial restrictions 
in patent licenses on the basis that patent-based products will be marketed more 
profitably by patentees and licensees is limited. As will be discussed, though use 
of territorial restrictions to establish market division increases the reward to 
patentees, the costs to society invariably are much greater. Further, the EEC's 
law relating to exclusive rights and territorial restrictions will often not be 
necessary for, or will do little to promote, the efficient distribution of patent-
based products. 
79 See P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 25, 46-49; Wheeler, A Reexamination of Antitrust Law and Exclusive 
Territorial Grants by Patentees, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 642, 662-66, (1971); see Kaplow, supra note 54, at 
1858-62, 1879. 
80 See Andewelt, supra note 66, at 2B-321. 
81 Royalty Terms, supra note 66, at 1200, 1223, 1227-1234; Fowlston, supra note 10, at 35-39. 
82 P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 24-25. 
83 Turner, Basic Principles, supra note 58, at 496. 
84 P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 32-35, 45-46, 65-67; Wheeler, supra note 79, at 650-56. 
85 P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 25, 50-53. 
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As mentioned, there are a number of reasons why territorial protection might 
facilitate the distribution of patent-based products. Territorial protection, how-
ever, often will not really be necessary for the most efficient distribution of a 
patent-based product. For example, while relying on licensees reduces a paten-
tee's risk, many prospective licensees will take a license without territorial pro-
tection. As a result it will often not be necessary to grant licensees exclusive 
rights and territorial protection as inducement. As well, if administrative costs 
are lower with only one licensee in a territory or a particular territory can only 
support one licensee, the patentee simply needs to refrain from granting more 
licenses. Again, it is not necessary that the patentee grant exclusive rights and 
territorial protection. 
The argument that territorial protection may facilitate territorial price dis-
crimination merits a closer examination. Territorial price discrimination can 
increase the return of patentees. Territorial protection in patent licenses can 
facilitate territorial price discrimination. This situation is illustrated by the fol-
lowing example. Assume that the sales revenue for a patent-based product is 
maximized in France when the price is 150 ECUS86 and is maximized in the 
Netherlands when the price is 200 ECUs. Total sales revenue for the patent-
based product will consequently be maximized if these prices are charged. Thus, 
the patentee's return necessarily will be higher if the different prices are charged 
than if the same price was charged in both countries.87 If the patentee is utilizing 
licensees in such a situation his return will be increased because of the higher 
royalties resulting from the maximized sales revenues in each country. 
In order for territorial price discrimination to be practiced, barriers to trade 
must exist between the territories where the different prices are charged. Oth-
erwise, purchasers in the higher priced territories will simply get their supplies 
from the lower priced territories.88 Suppliers in lower priced territories will be 
able to sell in the higher priced territories provided that the difference between 
prices in the territories is sufficient to cover the cost of transport and market-
ing.89 In this situation, licensees in lower priced territories, and their customers, 
will be willing to sell in higher priced territories for a lower price than the profit 
maximizing price in the higher priced territories. If such sales occur the system 
of territorial price discrimination breaks down. Territorial restrictions in patent 
licenses can be used to prevent this from occurring. This is because patent 
licenses can include provisions prohibiting licensees and their customers from 
selling outside their territories.90 Thus, allowing such restrictions in patent 
86 European Currency Units. 
87 P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 45; Wheeler, supra note 79, at 652. 
88 P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 33. 
89 [d. at 33-34. 
90 [d. at 33-35, 45; Wheeler, supra note 79, at 653; V. KORAH, supra note 8, at 86. 
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licenses could facilitate territorial price discrimination and thus could increase 
the reward to patentees. 
This argument, however, has little validity in the EEC context. The European 
Court, in Maize Seeds, held that the inclusion of a term in a patent prohibiting 
licensees' customers from selling outside their territories would ensure that an 
exclusive license was closed and would consequently fall within Article 85(1). 
Likewise, Article 3(11) of the Block Exemption provides that including restric-
tions on resale will cause a patent license to lose its exemption. Thus, since 
resales by customers cannot be prevented, EEC law does little to facilitate 
territorial price discrimination. 
An argument which supports the EEC's expansive approach to territorial 
restrictions to patent licenses is that patentees will be able to get licensees to 
take licenses where licensees would not otherwise have done SO.91 Every time 
that a licensee takes a license that neither he nor anyone else would have taken 
without exclusive rights and territorial protection, the patentee's reward has 
been increased. This is because the patentee will receive license fees and royalties 
he would not have received if the license were not taken. 
This argument, however, is weakened by the fact that situations where ter-
ritorial protection will be necessary to induce licensees to take a license are 
infrequent. Territorial protection will only induce a licensee to take a license 
when the protection will increase the return of the licensee by allowing him to 
charge higher prices. This may not occur very often in the EEC, given the types 
of territorial protection permitted under EEC law. For example, as discussed 
previously, if there are price differences between Member States and there are 
no natural barriers to trade, parallel imports from customers will prevent a 
licensee from charging higher prices even if he has exclusive rights and terri-
torial protection from the patentee and other licensees. Thus, in these circum-
stances, promising to grant a licensee the territorial protection allowed under 
EEC law will not be much of an incentive for the licensee to take a license. 
Further, if there are close substitutes for the patent-based product, a licensee 
will be unable to charge higher prices regardless of the territorial protection he 
has and regardless of price differences or barriers to trade. This is because the 
customer would simply buy a close substitute if the licensee attempted to charge 
higher prices. 
A situation in which exclusive rights and territorial protections are likely to 
induce the taking of a license is where the patent involves a new or significantly 
different type of technology. This is because there will probably be no close 
substitutes for the patent-based product. Moreover, in such situations other 
91 This is discussed by Wheeler. supra note 79, at 656-62; FOWLSTON, supra note 10, at 38-39; P. 
DEMARET, supra note 13. at 52-53; Turner, supra note 58, at 49.~-96; Gibbons, supra note 64, at 895. 
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licensees will be reluctant to take a license due to the significant development 
costs and/or risks. This consideration suggests that there may be some validity 
in the European Court's emphasis, in Maize Seeds, on new technology.92 The 
Court's focus on new technology will be discussed below with respect to the 
costs arising from territorial restrictions. 
An analysis of the benefits of territorial restrictions permitted under EEC law 
thus shows that the reward to patentees only increases in limited circumstances. 
It thus seems likely that EEC law in this area provides only a limited incentive 
for innovation. This should, however, be qualified in one way. If the reward 
that innovators perceived they could obtain was higher than that they in fact 
would obtain from the permitted territorial restrictions, EEC law could provide 
a greater incentive to innovation than the foregoing suggests. As Kaplow has 
pointed out, innovators' decisions may be influenced, and thus innovation may 
be promoted, by innovators' perceptions of potential rewards, which are at 
variance with the rewards they will actually receive.93 The distinction between 
innovators' perceptions and actual rewards, however, is a largely unexplored 
area.94 Due to this, and given that there is reason to question the extent to 
which patentees' rewards are in fact increased under present EEC law, it is not 
surprising that the relaxation of EEC law in this area has arisen not only from 
the idea that innovation will be promoted, but also from a decreased concern 
about the anti-competitive costs of territorial restrictions. 
3. Costs 
Territorial restrictions in patent licenses can impose a cost on society. This is 
because the use of such restrictions can detrimentally affect competition. Spe-
cifically, economic costs arise when territorial restrictions are used to establish 
or maintain a division of the market. 95 Territorial restrictions can cause market 
division in two situations. The first is where there are no close substitutes for 
the patent-based product. In this situation the only competition which occurs is 
between sellers of the same product.96 This type of competition is known as 
intrabrand competition. Here, exclusivity and territorial protections can be used 
92 A number of commentators recommend that exclusive rights and territorial restrictions be allowed 
in such circumstances. See Wheeler, supra note 79, at 656-62; Gibbons, supra note 64, at 895; R. 
WHISH, supra note 10, at 357; A. CROTTI, supra note 64, at 273. As discussed, supra note 20, Valentine 
Korah holds the view that the Maize Seeds doctrine should include situations where there is no close 
substitute for a new product. The analysis in the text is applicable to this situation as well, since the 
analysis rests on the idea that there are no close substitutes for the patent-based product. 
93 Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1838-39. 
94Id. 
9S See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at 224-29. 
96 Baden Fuller, Economic Issues Relating to Property Rights in Trademarks: Export Bans, Differential 
Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging, 6 EUR. L. REV. 162, 169 (1981). 
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to restrict intrabrand competition between those selling the patent-based prod-
uct. If the restrictions are strict enough, the patentee and each licensee will 
have market control in their respective territory. 
If there are close substitutes for a patent-based product, regardless of the 
strictness of restrictions on intrabrand competition, the restrictions will fail to 
give a patentee or his licensees market control in their territories. This is because 
the patentee and licensees will face interbrand competitions, that is, competition 
from sellers of similar, though not identical, products. 
Territorial restrictions in patent licenses, however, can be used to restrict 
interbrand competition. To see how, assume that there is interbrand competition 
between several producers. One of the producers could invent a slight, but 
patentable, improvement to his product which he would then patent. Instead 
of utilizing the patent he could agree with his competitors that he would grant 
licenses to them so they could incorporate his patented improvement in their 
products. The patent licenses would each give the patentee and his licensees 
exclusive rights in their particular territory and would prevent sales in each 
other's territory. The patent licenses would thus be used to eliminate the inter-
brand competition between the several producers and would give each market 
control in their particular territory. 
The result of the patentee and licensee attaining market control is the same 
regardless of whether such control is gained through restrictions on intrabrand 
or interbrand competition. In both situations, the patentee or licensee will be 
able to charge a higher price for the patent-based product than he could if he 
was facing competition. The patentee or licensee has the incentive to charge a 
higher price since doing so will maximize his total revenue. If he does raise the 
price, less of the product will be purchased as some consumers who would have 
purchased at the competitive price will not at the higher price. This means that 
some of society's resources are being allocated towards what would have been 
a less efficient use of resources absent the restraints on competition. The less 
efficient use of resources resulting from the restraints is a loss to society.97 
Thus, the economic argument against allowing a particular territorial restric-
tion in patent licenses is that the societal loss which arises from permitting the 
restriction will exceed the benefits which arise from the incentives to invent 
provided by allowing the restriction.98 Generally, it is recognized that if the 
patentee and licensees were allowed to use territorial restrictions to establish 
collusive divisions of the market the resulting costs would greatly exceed the 
benefits.99 Upon closer examination, however, the costs arising from exclusive 
rights and territorial restrictions in patent licenses may not be as substantial as 
9' L. SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at 2-3, 540-4l. 
98 See P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 34. 
99 Kaplow. supra note 54, at 1859; BOWMAN, supra note 72, at 63; L. SULLIVAN. supra note 56, at 554. 
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the foregoing suggests. The reason is that exclusive rights and territorial re-
strictions may not be as anticompetitive as the analysis above indicates. This is 
because in various circumstances they may create intrabrand competition or 
interbrand competition. 
In circumstances where a patent license would not have been granted without 
exclusive rights and territorial protection, intrabrand competition is created. 
Here, the patent-based technology will be manufactured and sold in a territory 
where it otherwise would not have been. As a result, consumers in the licensee's 
territory will gain access to the product where they otherwise might not have. 
Further, depending on the nature of the territorial restrictions in the license, 
the licensee or his customers may be able to sell the patent-based product in 
other territories. This would increase intrabrand competition in those territo-
ries. lOo 
The primary situation where exclusive rights and territorial protection in 
patent licenses can promote interbrand competition is where they are included 
for a vertical purpose. IOI This occurs when the purpose of the restrictions is to 
make distribution of the patent-based product more efficient. In such a situation 
the patentee, who may still sell the product, views his licensees as distributors 
of the product, rather than as competitors. J02 This would be the case, for 
example, where a patentee who operated in the United Kingdom did not want 
to operate in the rest of Europe and relied on licensees to manufacture and sell 
the patent-based product in the rest of Europe. 
If a product is distributed more efficiently, this will enable the product to 
compete more effectively with close substitutes. Thus, if exclusive rights and 
territorial restrictions are included in patent licenses for a vertical purpose and 
there are close substitutes for the patent-based product, the exclusive rights and 
territorial restrictions should foster interbrand competition. Including exclusive 
rights and territorial restrictions in patent licenses, as described previously, may 
not be a very effective way to improve distribution of a patent-based product. 
A patentee will presumably alter his pattern of exclusive licenses and territorial 
restrictions, however, if they are causing him to lose sales and royalties revenue 
because of competition from close substitutes. Thus, if exclusive rights and 
100 On the foregoing, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at 525-26; B. CAWTHRA, supra note 10, at 75; 
Handler & Blechman, supra note 32, at 407-08,427. 
lUI The following is based on R. WHISH, supra note 10, 347-49; Andewelt, supra note 66, at 2B-321; 
Gyselen, supra note 50, at 654-57,662-63; Selinger, A Reappraisal of Post-Sale Vertical Restrictions Under 
the Sylvania Rule of Reason, in THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING: LICENSING IN THE 1980s 2B-217, 
especially at 2B-228-40 (R. Goldscheider & T. Arnold eds. 1983); V. KORAH, EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
AGREEMENTS IN THE EEC: REGULATION 67/67 REPLACED, 7-9 (1984); Joliet, Territorial and Exclusive 
Trademark Licensing Under the E.E.C. Law of Competition, 15 INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 
L. 21, 28-29, 33-34 (1984). 
102 Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1865. 
1987] TERRITORIAL RIGHTS IN PATENT LICENSES 73 
territorial restrictions have been adopted for a vertical purpose, market forces 
should force them to be altered or dropped if they are not promoting interbrand 
com petition. 103 
In adopting the Block Exemption the European Commission did not expressly 
rely on the argument that allowing exclusive rights and territorial protection in 
patent licenses promotes interbrand competition. In fact, the Commission is 
somewhat skeptical of this line of reasoning. lo4 The Commission, however, did 
rely in part on the assertion that allowing such provisions can promote intra-
brand competition. lOS This is indicated by Recitals 12 and 15 of the Block 
Exemption. Recital 12 states that a primary reason for allowing exclusive licenses 
and the territorial protection set out in the Block Exemption is to encourage 
the granting of licenses. The Commission maintains that this will lead to more 
companies having the opportunity to manufacture and sell patent-based prod-
ucts and to a wider distribution of patented technology in the EEC. Recital 15 
says that the intrabrand competition created by the granting of licenses will not 
be eliminated by restrictions in the licenses. The rationale underlying this claim 
is that parallel imports and some passive sales are safeguarded. 
In Maize Seeds the European Court's attitude towards intrabrand and inter-
brand competition was unclear. The Court indicated in paragraph 57 of the 
judgment that open exclusive licenses promote interbrand competition. The 
Court said in that paragraph that if licenses were not granted, because open 
exclusive licenses were not permitted, this would be damaging to the dissemi-
nation of a new technology and would prejudice competition in the EEC be-
tween the new product and similar existing products. 
The European Court's emphasis on openness and new technology, however, 
is more consistent with the idea that the Court was concerned with intrabrand 
rather than interbrand competition.!')6 The Court's ruling that patent licenses 
incorporating export bans on licensees or resellers would be closed, and thus 
would automatically fall within Article 85(1), indicates that the Court was seeking 
to preserve intrabrand competition. Further, in a situation where a new tech-
nology is involved, the preservation of intrabrand competition will likely be 
more relevant than the promotion of interbrand competition. This is because 
the newer the technology in a patent-based product, the less chance there is for 
103 See, e.g., Gyselen supra note 50, at 645-55. 
104 Van der Esch, supra note 9, at 541-45, 560-61; Gyselen, supra note 50, at 658-61, 667-68; 
Current Practical Problems in Distribution: Panel Discussion, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 643-45 (1985) [here-
inafter Current Practical Problems]; Caspari, EEC Enforcement Policy and Practice: An Official View, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 603-05 (1984); Collins, Efficiency and Equity in Vertical Competition Law: Balancing 
the Tensions in the E.E.C. and the United States, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE 
LAW INSTITUTE-ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE E.E.C. 501, 524-26 (B. Hawk ed. 1983). 
105 See supra note 4, at Recitals 12 and 15. See aLIO 14TH REPORT, supra note 51, at 13-14,37-40. 
106 The following is based primarily on Hoffmann & O'Farrell, supra note 8, at 106. 
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close substitutes so that interbrand competition can occur. Thus, where a new 
technology is involved, the preservation of intrabrand competition may be 
crucial because intrabrand competition might be the only type of competition 
which can occur. If the Court had taken this line of reasoning to its logical 
conclusion, it would have held that territorial restrictions promote intrabrand 
competition. While such an argument was advanced in Maize Seeds, the Court 
did not, however, express a view on the effect of territorial restrictions on 
intrabrand competition. 107 Although in Maize Seeds the Court's view on territorial 
protection and interbrand competition was problematic, other cases indicate 
that the Court is becoming more sympathetic to the idea that vertical restrictions 
are procompetitive. In both Coditel and Pronuptia, a franchising case, the Court 
held that vertical restrictions did not automatically fall within Article 85(1 ).108 
In the Windsurfing case, however, the Court found that some vertical restrictions 
in patent licenses which were not territorial in nature did fall within Article 
85( 1 ).109 
The European Court's noncommittal attitude towards the idea that territorial 
protection in patent licenses have a positive effect on intrabrand competition is 
understandable. First, it can only really be said that exclusive rights and terri-
torial restrictions create intrabrand competition by causing licenses to be granted 
if the licenses would not have been granted absent the exclusive rights and 
territorial restrictions. This will not occur often because in many circumstances 
licensees can be compensated satisfactorily for the lack of exclusive rights and 
territorial protection through lower license fees and royalty payments. lIO Next, 
it should be recognized that territorial restrictions can restrict intrabrand com-
petition. This occurs, for example, because the granting of an exclusive license 
prevents the patentee from granting licenses in the future. Territorial restric-
tions may also restrict intrabrand competition if a patent license places restric-
tions on where the patent-based product can be sold. III 
The European Commission has been criticized for its lack of enthusiasm 
concerning the idea that exclusive rights and territorial restrictions promote 
interbrand competition. ll2 The Commission's attitude, like the European 
I07/d. at 104. 
108 See Current Practical Problems, supra note 104, at 665-66; Pronuptia v. Pronuptia, I Common Mkt. 
L.R. 414 (1986). 
109 Case 193/83. The Court's decision in this case had not been reported at the time of writing. The 
Commission's decision is reported in I Common Mkt. L.R. 1(1984). 
110 P. DE MARET, supra note 13, at 50. 
III The Commission relied on arguments similar to this, without referring specifically to intrabrand 
competition, in holding in the mid-1970s that exclusive rights and territorial restrictions infringed 
Article 85(1). For criticism of the Court's view, see P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 112-14; GLEISS, 
COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW 237-38 (1978). 
112 V. KORAH, supra note 8, at 61, III; R. WHISH, supra note 10, at 349, 363-65; Gyselen, supra note 
50, at 666-68; Joliet, supra note 101, at 33-36. 
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Court's attitude with respect to intrabrand competition, is, however, understand-
able. As discussed above, the extent to which exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions make distribution of patent-based products more efficient is ques-
tionable. This suggests that exclusive rights and territorial restrictions may 
frequently be used for purposes other than promoting interbrand competition. 
For example, exclusive rights and territorial restrictions may be used to establish 
market control. 
If close substitutes for a patent-based product exist, then the concern about 
exclusive rights and territorial restrictions being used to establish market control 
is minimal. The competition from the close substitutes will prevent the patentee 
and licensees from charging supracompetitive prices and market forces will 
cause the exclusive rights and territorial restrictions to be dropped if they are 
not promoting the efficient distribution of the patent-based product. 
The situation is different if there are no close substitutes for the patent-based 
product. In that situation it is unlikely that exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions would be included in a patent license for a vertical purpose. ll3 This 
is because the patentee and licensees will be able to charge supracompetitive 
prices in their own territory. These prices will be successful since the patentee 
and his licensees do not compete in each other's territory and there are no close 
substitutes for the patent-based product. As a result, where exclusive rights and 
territorial restrictions are included in a patent license, in such circumstances, 
the purpose and effect of such exclusive rights and restrictions will likely be to 
stifle competition and create or maintain market control. 
If no close substitutes exist, in that the technology involved in the patent is 
particularly new, the situation may well be different. l14 In these circumstances 
it is less likely that a patentee will consider using his patent for market control 
purposes. This is due to the fact that he potentially will be able to make 
significant profits on the basis of his patent alone. In addition, in this situation 
granting patent licenses with exclusive rights and territorial protection may well 
be a logical and sensible way of distributing the patent-based product. The 
patentee will want licensees in order to help spread the risk involved in mar-
keting a new product, to defray what will probably be significant development 
costs, and to market the product in territories the patentee might not otherwise 
be able to exploit. The licensees, in turn, may want exclusive rights and terri-
torial protection before becoming involved in a potentially risky project. 
113 See P. DEMARET, supra note 13. at 46-47. who asserts that collusion is most likely where there are 
relatively few firms in the market and the patent is of minor importance. This is consistent with the 
analysis here as it is unlikely that there will be a significant number of close substitutes for the patent-
based product under these circumstances. 
II. Wheeler. supra note 79. at 656-62. 
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This line of reasoning suggests a justification for the emphasis on new tech-
nology in Maize Seeds. While some commentators agree with this assertion,ll5 
the European Court in Maize Seeds, despite references to new technology, did 
not appear to rely on such reasoning. If the Court had, it would not have 
stressed the importance of competition with existing products. This is because, 
as the basis of the foregoing analysis indicates, the newness of the technology 
means that there are no close substitutes for the patent-based product. 
To summarize the discussion of economic costs, while territorial restrictions 
can impose anticompetitive costs on society, this is not always the case. Territorial 
restrictions can have procompetitive effects. The European Commission has 
recognized that territorial restrictions can increase interbrand competition and 
the European Court is becoming increasingly sympathetic to the idea that 
territorial restrictions can promote interbrand competition. The fact that the 
Commission and the Court have ambivalent attitudes about interbrand and 
intrabrand competition respectively, however, indicates that there is some con-
fusion in the EEC about the competitive effects of territorial restrictions. As a 
result, the extent to which territorial restrictions are in fact procompetitive or 
anticompetitive is unclear. 
4. Conclusion 
Having discussed the economic costs and benefits of territorial restrictions, 
some conclusions can be drawn. It is quite easy, from an economic perspective, 
to categorize the situations where exclusive rights and territorial protection in 
patent rights are beneficial or detrimental. If there are close substitutes for the 
patent-based product in question, there is little reason to object to patentees 
and licensees providing for exclusivity and whatever territorial protection they 
see fit. The presence of interbrand competition will prevent the patentee and 
licensees from charging supracompetitive prices. Further, if allowing exclusive 
rights and territorial protection in these circumstances does permit patent-based 
products to be distributed more efficiently and profitably it will benefit the 
market and promote innovation. The market will benefit from increased inter-
brand competition. Innovation will be promoted because the greater profits will 
provide an incentive for inventive activity. 
Further, an argument, based on economics, can be asserted to allow exclusive 
rights and at least some territorial restrictions for products which have no close 
substitutes because a patented, novel technology has been utilized. This is be-
cause permitting exclusive rights and territorial restrictions may encourage 
115 Two commentators who think that exclusive rights and territorial restrictions are most justified 
when the patent involves a new technology are Wheeler, supra note 79, at 657-62 and Gibbons, supra 
note 64, at 895. 
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licensees to take licenses where they otherwise might not. This will be beneficial 
to patentees as they will be able to: (1) diffuse risk; (2) defray development 
costs; (3) obtain license fees and royalty payments they otherwise might not 
have obtained; and (4) exploit territories they might not otherwise have been 
able to operate in. These increased benefits to patentees will presumably be an 
incentive to innovation. The fact that allowing exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions will encourage licensing is also beneficial because this will increase 
intrabrand competition. This is particularly important because the lack of close 
substitutes means that there will be no interbrand competition. 
The situation where there is little justification for exclusive rights and terri-
torial restrictions in patent licenses is where there is little or no competition 
with the patent-based product and the patent does not involve a particularly 
novel technology. In this situation establishing and maintaining market control 
and division is the likely motivation for including exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions in patent licenses. Further, the effect of exclusive rights and terri-
torial restrictions in these circumstances is that the patentee and his licensees 
will be able to charge monopolistic prices in their territories. In this situation, 
as discussed previously, the economic costs to society invariably exceed the 
benefits. 
This suggests that from an economic viewpoint exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions should be permissible in some circumstances but not others. Factors 
such as the presence of close substitutes and the novelty of the patent may help 
to determine the desirability of exclusive rights and territorial restrictions in 
individual cases. If a policymaker is going to adopt a general policy towards 
exclusive rights and territorial restrictions, however, the policy adopted will 
depend on the policymakers' perceptions about the likelihood that exclusive 
rights and territorial restrictions will be used to establish market division and 
control. In light of the detrimental effects which arise when such rights and 
restrictions have this purpose, and the neutral or beneficial effects otherwise, if 
a policymaker believes that the rights and restrictions are frequently used to 
divide and control a market, then a strict posture should be adopted. Conversely, 
if the policymaker believes the rights and restrictions are not used to divide and 
control a market then a more expansive approach is justified. 
The European Commission is skeptical concerning the argument that exclu-
sive rights and territorial restrictions create interbrand competition. This skep-
ticism suggests that where a patent is not particularly novel, the Commission 
will frequently suspect that such rights and restrictions have an anticompetitive 
effect or purpose.11 6 In light of this skepticism one would expect the Block 
116 Two Commission staff members who have expressed views similar to this are Van der Esch. supra 
note 9. at 549 and Cas pari. supra note 104, at 604. See also V. KORAH. supra note 8. at 39-40. 
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Exemption to take a fairly strict approach towards exclusivity and territorial 
restrictions. The Block Exemption, however, takes a relatively expansive ap-
proach towards territorial restrictions. ll7 This Article will next outline a possible 
explanation of why the Block Exemption takes such an approach. 
B. Market Integration 
In the EEC it is impossible to consider exclusive rights and territorial restric-
tions in patent licenses from a purely economic perspective. This is because 
market integration is a central objective of EEC competition law.ll8 Thus, a 
major purpose of EEC competition law is to prevent the establishment of private 
economic barriers within the Common Market. Jl9 
The European Commission and European Court's strict approach towards 
exclusive rights and territorial protections originally arose more from concern 
over market integration than from worries about the anticompetitive effects of 
such rights and restrictions. 120 This is not surprising in light of the fact that two 
of the central purposes of territorial protections directly conflict with the elim-
ination of private economic barriers in the EEC.l2l One such purpose is to 
restrict patent licenses to particular territories which are frequently based on 
the borders of the Member States. The second purpose is to restrict movement 
of patent-based goods between territories. 
As mentioned, the European Commission's posture towards exclusive rights 
and territorial restrictions is significantly more expansive than it was a few years 
ago. In fact, despite the concern over market integration in the EEC, the Block 
Exemption is only marginally stricter on exclusive rights and territorial restric-
tions than the law in the United States where market integration is not a 
concern. 122 
It can be argued that the European Commission's more relaxed view towards 
territoriality in patent licenses is justified on a market integration basis. For 
example, if territorial protection does significantly promote interbrand com-
petition, market integration might be enhanced by a permissive approach to-
wards territorial protection. This is because promoting more intensive inter-
II? See text accompanying notes 28 & 107. 
118 J. PELKMANS, MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1-3, 189 (1984); Casati, supra 
note 13, at 322, 325, 348 n.217; Hawk, supra note 21, 737-38. 
119 Gyselen, supra note 50, at 650-51. 
120 Lang, supra note 16, at 60-61; Ewing, Antitrust Enforcement and the Patent System: Similarities in the 
European and American Approach, 11 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 279, 294 (1980). 
121 Lang, supra note 16, at 60, 70-71; A. CROTTI, supra note 64, at 253-54; R. MERKIN & K. WILLIAMS, 
supra note 6, at 331; Casati, supra note 13, at 327. 
122 A number of commentators say that the emphasis on market integration in the EEC has resulted 
in EEC law being stricter. See, e.g., A. CROTTI, supra note 64, 14-15; Baillie, supra note 51, at 689; 
Caspari, supra note 104, at 600. 
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brand competItion throughout the EEC may do more to promote market 
integration than would ensuring that a product is available at the same price 
throughout the Common Market. 123 Further, it can be argued that it is futile to 
try to attack exclusive rights and territorial protections in order to ensure that 
products of the same brand are available at the same price throughout the EEC. 
A much better method to ensure the same price would be to attack the primary 
causes of the price differences, such as different national regulations. 124 
The European Commission, however, placed no emphasis on these arguments 
in adopting a more permissive approach towards territorial protection in the 
Block Exemption. As previously mentioned, the Commission similarly did not 
adopt any arguments that territorial restrictions promote interbrand competi-
tion. This suggests that the Commission may still have concerns about the 
negative impact of exclusive rights and territorial protection on market inte-
gration and interbrand competition. Indeed, some observers have said that the 
Commission is still skeptical about the desirability of territorial protections. 125 
If the European Commission is still concerned about the impact of exclusive 
rights and territorial protections on competition and market integration one 
important question arises. Why was the Block Exemption's treatment of terri-
torial protection more liberal than the Commission's previous position? In an-
swer to this question, it appears that the change likely came about, at least in 
part, because of lobbying. In the mid-1970s, business interests and certain 
Member States began to put pressure on the Commission to relax its views on 
exclusivity and territorial restrictions. 126 This pressure intensified when the 
Commission was developing the Block Exemption. The proposed provision 
which attracted the most attention set out that the automatic exemption for 
exclusive rights and export bans was restricted to companies with a turnover of 
less than 100m. ECUs.127 The Commission stated, at the time, that only small 
and medium sized companies needed the incentive to develop technology pro-
vided by exclusive rights and territorial restrictions. 128 It is arguable that the 
Commission also thought that the adverse effects on market integration and 
competition would be less if the automatic exemption applied to small and 
medium sized companies. 
In the face of continued lobbying the European Commission, in 1984, agreed 
to delete the turnover limit. The Commission's position on the turnover limit 
123 Gyselen. supra note 50. at 667-68; Handler & Blechman. supra note 32. at 410; Fuller. supra note 
96. at 173. 
124 See Gyselen. supra note 50. at 667-68. 
125 See sources cited supra note 104 and V. KORAH supra note 8. 
126 B. CAWTHRA. supra note 10. at 207-08; Casati. supra note 13. at 348. n. 214. 
127 Brunsvold. supra note 31. at 291-96; Holley & Siragusa. supra note 32. at 350-51. 
128 Burnside. supra note 68. at 2B-70. 
80 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. X, No.1 
was once apparently steadfast. 129 It was relaxed, however, because the provision 
would have been difficult to administer l30 and the Commission was eager to 
obtain the consensus thought to be necessary for the adoption of the regulation. 
This was particularly important in light of the increasing backlog of applications 
to exempt patent licenses. 131 
The European Commission thus appears to have down played concerns about 
market integration and competition in the face of lobbying and administrative 
concerns. 132 It may also be asserted that the Commission adopted a more liberal 
view towards territorial restrictions in part because it developed a more favor-
able view of the extent to which territorial restrictions promote innovation and 
intrabrand competition. Exclusive rights and territorial restrictions, however, 
can impose significant economic costs and can detrimentally effect market in-
tegration. Given this, it would have been reassuring to have the Commission 
make more of an effort to come to terms with these concerns in adopting the 
Block Exemption. Instead, it appears that the Commission down played them 
because of lobbying and administrative pressures. 
C. Administration and Enforcement 
In addition to being relevant to patent licenses, Maize Seeds and the Block 
Exemption raise issues relating to the administration and enforcement of EEC 
competition law. It is not possible to deal with all of these here. Still, it is 
impossible to evaluate the EEC's approach to exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions in patent licenses without at least considering administration and 
enforcement. 
From an administration and enforcement perspective, the Block Exemption 
certainly has its faults. A primary fault is that the Block Exemption will probably 
act as a code of conduct. Parties are likely to structure the terms of their patent 
license agreements in order to ensure that the agreement falls within the Block 
Exemption. 133 The reason for this is that if a patent license contains a term 
which is more restrictive than those set out in the Block Exemption, the patent 
license does not gain an automatic exemption and is unlikely to be exempted 
under an individual application. 134 The European Commission, as previously 
129 Brunsvold, supra note 31, at 294. 
"" Hawk, supra note 21, at 762. 
151 Lewin & Martin, supra note 8, at 61. 
152 Hawk, supra note 21, at 764-65; V. KORAH, supra note 8, at 39-40. 
133 Baillie, supra note 51, at 695; R. WHISH, supra note 10, at 364; Forrester & Norall, The Laicization 
of Community Law-Self-Help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied, in 
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE-ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF 
THE E.E.C. 305, 319-20 (B. Hawk ed. 1983); V. KORAH, supra note 8, at 110; Questions and Answers, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 703, 706-07 (1985). 
". Baillie, supra note 51, at 695. 
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mentioned, is still skeptical of territorial restrictions. As a result, it is unlikely 
that the Commission would exempt territorial protections which are more com-
prehensive than those allowed under the Block Exemption. 135 Further, even if 
an individual exemption could be obtained it would involve a significant delay. 
This delay will probably exist even if the Block Exemption reduces the number 
of agreements being sent to the Commission. 136 
If the Block Exemption does function as a code of conduct, it may retard 
innovation and interbrand competition. For example, a license containing re-
strictions on where purchasers of the patent-based product could sell the prod-
uct will not fall within the Block Exemption by virtue of Article 3(11).137 Fur-
thermore, such a license probably would not be exempted under an individual 
application. As previously described, however, restrictions on resale are probably 
necessary for territorial price discrimination to be practiced and probably would 
encourage licensees to take licenses. Restrictions on resale, therefore, can sig-
nificantly increase the reward of patentees and may facilitate the efficient dis-
tribution of patent-based products. Thus, because a likely effect of the Block 
Exemption will be preventing restrictions on resale, the Block Exemption prob-
ably retards innovation and interbrand competition. 
On the other hand, the Block Exemption, in some instances, may allow patent 
license agreements which have significant anticompetitive effects or are detri-
mental to market integration to go undetected. Such a situation would result, 
for example, if a patentee and his licensees control a substantial part of the 
market and parallel imports are unlikely because price differences between 
territories are small. In this situation the territorial restrictions which are ex-
empted under the Block Exemption may be sufficient for the patentee and the 
licensees to charge supracompetitive prices and may reduce substantially the 
free movement of goods in relation to the market in question. 138 Such agree-
ments would not have to be notified because of the Block Exemption. Further, 
they probably would remain undetected. This is because the European Com-
mission uncovers relatively few Article 85 violations by acting on its own initiative 
and because the likely absence of a damages remedy discourages complaints 
from individuals. 139 
It is relatively easy to identify the problems inherent in the Block Exemption. 
Proposing a viable alternative, however, is more difficult. One such alternative 
is to amend the Block Exemption. This could be accomplished by making the 
Block Exemption responsive to the market share of the parties. The possibility 
135 V. KORAH. supra note 8, at 40. 
136 [d. at 110; Forrester & NoraH, supra note 133, at 342. 
137 See supra note 4, at art. 3( II). 
138 See P. DEMARET, supra note 13, at 49. 
139 D. GUY & G. LEIGH, supra note 7, at 373. 
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that exclusive rights and territorial protection will have anticompetitive effects 
is significantly greater when the patentee and licensees have a large market 
share. This is because close substitutes will not be readily available. Thus, in 
situations involving a large market share it might be desirable to require the 
parties to apply for an individual exemption. An example of such a situation is 
where the parties want to incorporate extensive territorial protections, such as 
export bans, on the patentee and the licensees. 14o 
Determining when an individual exemption should be applied for is the 
primary problem with the amendment suggested previously. Indeed, the Eu-
ropean Commission encountered the same difficulty in preparing the Block 
Exemption. The Commission wanted to limit most automatic territorial exemp-
tions to small and medium sized companies. 141 This was the purpose of the 
maximum turnover limit. 142 Because the Commission realized that the turnover 
limit would be difficult to apply, it considered relying on market share. The 
Commission, however, could not come up with a workable solution based on 
market share. This was because the calculations involved would have been 
imprecise. Accordingly, it may be impossible to devise a feasible way of ensuring 
that companies with large market shares apply for an exemption. 
Given the problems with the Block Exemption, some writers have recom-
mended an entirely different approach. 143 They assert, recognizing that the 
need for the Block Exemption arose from the European Commission being 
overloaded with individual applications, that Article 85(1) should be interpreted 
less strictly. They suggest, for example, that patent license agreements which 
promote interbrand competition more than they restrict intrabrand competition 
should not fall within Article 85(1). The result of such an approach would be 
that fewer patent license agreements would violate Article 85(1). This, conse-
quently, would decrease the demand for Article 85(3) exemptions. 
The European Court has taken steps in recent cases which are consistent with 
such an approach. In Maize Seeds, Coditel, and Pronuptia, the Court has held that 
provisions which do or potentially could restrict intrabrand competition do not 
violate Article 85( 1). The Court has yet to develop a consistent line of reasoning 
in these cases. It is distinctly possible, however, that the Court is moving towards 
140 In the United States a similar approach has been adopted in relation to vertical restrictions. The 
courts will allow almost any vertical restrictions as long as the market share of the parties is small. If 
the market share is large, however, the parties are called upon to present evidence to justify the 
agreement. See Gyselen, supra note 50, at 645-58. 
1.1 The following is based on Brunsvold. supra note 31. at 293-95; Holley & Siragusa, supra note 
32. at 351; and Handler & Blechman. supra note 32, at 408. 
142 See text accompanying notes 127-30. 
143 See. e.g .• Forrester & Norall, supra note 133. at 306-12.332-33; Baillie. supra note 51. at 695-
97; V. KORAH, supra note 8, at Ill; Industrial Property Under E.E.C. Law: Panel Discussion. in ANNUAL 
PROCEEDINGS OF FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE-ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE E.E.C. 
563,69-73 (B. Hawk ed. 1983). 
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a position where agreements which promote competition more than they restrict 
competition do not violate Article 85(1). 
There are problems, nevertheless, with this approach as well. First, this ap-
proach could emasculate Article 85. 144 The parties of licensing agreements 
would, in essence, be given the authority to decide whether to notify their 
agreements to the European Commission. This is because such parties would 
make the initial decision whether their agreement was anticompetitive and thus 
needed an exemption. In exercising such authority, it is reasonable to assume 
the parties would not notify the Commission. This is due to both the delay 
involved in such notice and the fact that such parties would usually take a 
favorable view of their own agreements. This pattern would be reinforced since 
the Commission would have little opportunity to analyze wrong decisions. In 
fact, in these circumstances a patent license would come to the Commission's 
attention only by virtue of a complaint or the Commission's investigations. 
A second problem with interpreting Article 85(1) less strictly and with aban-
doning the Block Exemption is that the law would be more uncertain. Presently 
in the United States, exclusive rights and territorial restrictions in agreements 
are most frequently examined under the Rule of Reason. Under the Rule of 
Reason analysis the legality of Exclusive rights and territorial restrictions is 
determined by discerning whether their overall effect is procompetitive or 
anticompetitive. This approach has rendered the law relating to territorial 
restrictions in patent licenses uncertain. I45 
If the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of territorial restrictions were 
used in the EEC to determine the legality of such restrictions, the law would 
become as uncertain as it is in the United States. This would be detrimental to 
licensing as uncertainty in this area makes parties reticent to license. I46 U ncer-
tainty is a problem which is less likely to arise with the Block Exemption. While 
the Block Exemption is arguably too rigid, it should make the law relating to 
patent licenses more predictable. 147 
V. CONCLUSION 
One finds no easy answers to the problems raised by exclusive rights and 
territorial restrictions in patent licenses. I48 Insights into the issues involved can 
144 See Van der Esch. supra note 9. at 550-52, 560; 2 H. SMITH & P. HERZOG. THE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY; A COMMENTARY ON THE E.E.C. TREATY. 3-25-6 (1984). 
145 Selinger, supra note 101, at 2B-237-40; Taylor, Appendix B: Analyzing Licensee-licensor Relationships; 
The Methodology Revisited, 53 ANTITRUST LJ. 577, 608-09 (1984). 
146 B. CAWTHRA, supra note 10, at 72; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at 545; and Royalty Terms, supra 
note 66, at 1198 n.3, 1200 n.lI. 
147 Lewin & Martin, supra note 8, at 65, 67; Hearn, supra note 8, at 326; R. WHISH, supra note 10, 
at 364; see Distribution Under E.E.C. Law, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW 
INSTITUTE-ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE E.E.C. 527, 528 (B. Hawk ed. 1983). 
148 Kaplow emphasizes this. See Kaplow, supra note 54, at 1815, 1888-89. 
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be gained by considering the economic costs and benefits of such rights and 
restrictions. In attempting to pinpoint a policy which will maximize the net 
economic benefits arising from territorial protection, however, one is simply 
faced with further questions. Are there close substitutes for the patent-based 
product? Is the exploitation of the patent-based product going to be risky and 
expensive? Is a potential innovator's perception of the reward he will receive 
from including territorial protection in patent licenses consistent with the actual 
reward he will receive? Because the answers to these and other relevant ques-
tions will differ in each case, it is difficult to state authoritatively which policy 
towards territorial protection will be the most sensible from an economic view-
point. 
Given this, the European Commission and the European Court face a difficult 
task in defining what types of territorial protections should be allowed in patent 
licenses. Their problems are compounded by the fact that such provisions can 
hinder market integration. Thus what might be the most sensible policy from 
an economic viewpoint might conflict with one of the other fundamental objec-
tives of the EEC.149 
Further, even if the European Court and European Commission could de-
velop an approach towards territorial protection which is satisfactory from an 
economic and market integration point of view, limitations in the EEC's system 
of competition law may prevent the approach from being adopted. The chosen 
policy may be too sophisticated to incorporate in a Block Exemption. For 
example, the policy may require a case by case analysis. Under present circum-
stances, however, a case by case approach probably cannot be adopted in the 
EEC. Past experience has shown that the Commission cannot satisfactorily con-
sider violations of Article 85(1), as it is presently interpreted, on a case by case 
basis. On the other hand, reducing the scope of Article 85(1) and having the 
parties to an agreement decide at first instance whether the agreement violates 
Article 85(1) is probably also undesirable. This is because many agreements 
which are anticompetitive or contrary to market integration might escape de-
tection as few violations of Article 85 are revealed by private complaints or the 
Commission's actions. 
While the European Commission and European Court admittedly face a 
difficult task with respect to formulating an EEC policy towards territorial 
protection, their policy is not beyond reproach. In the past, the Commission 
and the Court have liberalized the law relating to exclusive rights and territorial 
restrictions. This liberalization arose because they became more receptive to the 
idea that such provisions promote innovation and less concerned about the 
possible anticompetitive effects of such provisions. This change of view is jus-
149 Current Practical Problems, supra note 104, at 655-66; Collins, supra note 104, at 525-26. 
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tified in that policies towards territorial protection in patent licenses are often 
altered when policymakers' perceptions of the costs and benefits involved 
change. 
In adopting the Block Exemption, however, the European Commission may 
have down played some of its concerns about the adverse effects of exclusive 
rights and territorial restrictions for other reasons. In particular, the Commis-
sion may have succumbed to lobbying and to time pressures dictated by an ever-
increasing backlog of patent licenses that had to be considered for individual 
exemptions. Such an approach is undesirable in an area where the issues are as 
complex as they are with territorial restrictions and where the Block Exemption 
will probably form the basis of the relevant law for some time to come. One 
can only hope that despite the Commission's actions the EEC has developed the 
most suitable and workable policy towards exclusive rights and territorial re-
strictions in patent licenses. 
